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ABSTRACT: My goal with this article is to present the elements involved in Cicero's criticism 
of Stoic rhetoric. First, I will present the rhetoric of the Stoics based on the testimonies we have 
left on these philosophers. Soon after, I will expose Cicero's criticisms of the Stoics. Next, I will 
argue that Cicero's criticisms arise because his proposal with rhetoric is different from the 
Stoics' proposal. Due to this difference, it is necessary to understand that the Stoics, on the other 
hand, also had motives to defend their vision of rhetoric in face of Ciceronian criticism. 
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RESUMO: Meu objetivo neste artigo é apresentar os elementos envolvidos na crítica de Cícero 
à retórica estoica. Inicialmente apresentarei a retórica dos estoicos baseado nos testemunhos que 
nos restaram sobre esses filósofos. Logo depois, exporei as críticas assinaladas por Cícero aos 
estoicos. Em seguida, argumentarei que as críticas de Cícero surgem em consequência de que 
sua proposta com a retórica é diferente da proposta estoica. Em função dessa diferença, é 
preciso compreender que os estoicos, em contrapartida, também tinham motivos para defender 
sua visão de retórica perante as críticas ciceronianas. 
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Initial considerations 
 
The philosopher, orator, and lawyer Marco Tullius Cicero is one of the main 
references to understand the philosophy of the Hellenistic period. Much of what is 
known today of the Skeptical, Epicurean, and Stoic schools is due to his books. With 
expository and critical texts, the Roman analyzes several details of these schools at the 
same time as he presents his opinions, giving his work an intellectual insight worthy of 
note. Therefore, Cicero often serves as a reference for those who want to know the 
philosophy of the time. Given the scarcity of material left from this period, testimonies 
such as those of Cicero often guide the interpretation of what the philosophical 
approaches of his time would be.  
On the other hand, despite the great relevance of Ciceronian expositions, it is 
neither necessary nor advisable to analyze the issues of the schools cited only by 
Cicero's testimonies. Although he is cautious and shows great intellectual honesty, he 
often elaborates criticisms that have no proper counterpoint. In our view, this seems to 
be the case with our subject, namely, the Stoic rhetoric. While Cicero contextualizes the 
rhetoric of Stoics with some information and examples, he does not address certain 
details that can be found in other works and testimonies. In this case, we aim, with this 
article, to explore Cicero's criticism of Stoics in the light of a greater understanding of 
what Stoic rhetoric is and what its purpose is. 
 
The Stoic rhetoric 
 
According to Atherton (1988, p. 424), the roots of Stoic rhetoric can be found in 
Plato's works. Inspired by the dialogues, Stoics defend an orator with knowledge, who 
is just and who wants only to improve his fellow citizens. In this case, it makes no sense 
for Stoics to seek ways of persuasion in rhetorical strategies that appeal to something 
other than good judgment on the issue
1
. Their purpose is for the orator to speak well, 
                                            
1
 It is not my objective, in this text, to deal with rhetorical elements used by later Stoics. It is known, for 
example, that Seneca reveals his rhetorical education in his texts. For more on Seneca, see REALE, 1994, 
p. lxxiii-lxxv. 
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always in view of something correct and just, using rhetoric to adjust speech so as to 
speak with precision (QUINTILIAN. Inst. Orat., I 15, 34)
2
 and to show the truth. Thus, 
although there is a Stoic rhetoric, and it is considered a science (epistéme) (DIOGENES 
LAERTIUS, VII, 42), its aim is not to achieve the mere convincing of the public, but to 
make good use of lógos - this being understood as discourse and reason - in order to 
encompass all that is necessary to good argumentation. 
Stoics do not use discursive adornments in their rhetoric, preferring a cleaner and 
more frank discourse. To them, there are five virtues in every speech: pure Greek 
(hellenismós), clarity (saphéneia), conciseness (syntomía), propriety or adaptation to the 
theme (prépon) and distinction (kataskeué). Stoics also establish two types of vices, 
barbarism (barbarismós) and solecism (soloikismós). Diogenes Laertius describes the 
meaning of each of them: 
 
Pure Greek is diction that is flawless grammatically and free of vulgar 
usage. Clarity is a style that presents what is thought in an intelligible 
way; conciseness a style that encompasses precisely what is necessary 
for elucidating the subject matter. Propriety lies in a style appropriate 
to the content; distinction is a style that avoids banality. Among vices 
of style, barbarism is speech that violates the common usage of 
distinguished Greeks, while in a solecism what is signified is 
incongruous (DIOGENES LAERTIUS, VII, 59 [P. Mensch]). 
 
As González observes, pure Greek, clarity and distinction are virtues proper to what 
classical rhetoric describes as simple or flat style. According to Cicero, the simple style 
does not involve speaking things to please the audience or to manipulate their passions, 
but is a sober speech aimed at establishing a good instructive argumentation 
(GONZÁLEZ, 2011, p. 172-175). The other two virtues, propriety (or adequacy) and 
conciseness are characteristically Stoic. Propriety refers to what is appropriate to speech, 
which is the subject or object in question: it is the subject that establishes what must be 
said and the way it is to be said (CICERO. De finibus, III, 19), not the auditorium and 
its circumstances. In this, the Stoics differ from classical rhetoric, since the latter 
characterizes propriety as adequacy to the public, which in Cicero is linked to the idea 
of decorum (decorum): “Ciceronian decorum undoubtedly has much to do with the 
                                            
2
 CRISIPO DE SOLOS, fr. 385. 
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Sophist concern for kairos: the sense of opportunity that makes the orator know what 
things to say, how to say them, to whom to say them and at what precise moment 
(GONZÁLEZ, 2011, p. 176). 
Conciseness, in turn, is probably the most evident virtue of Stoic discourse. 
Through conciseness, Stoics reject what others would place as a virtue of speech: 
ornament (CICERO. De Oratore, 24, 79). Concise speech is transparent, without 
adornment, only adhering to what is necessary. Furthermore, conciseness seems to 
agree with Zeno's emphasis on brevity in the argument (ATHERTON, 1988, p. 412). In 
this case, it is worth quoting M. Schofield's interpretation on that brevity
3
:  
 
(...) if you want an argument to be as safe and strong as possible, then 
you must keep it as short as possible. Safeness and strength are at least 
characteristically the sorts of argumentative virtues looked for by 
philosophers keen to make their arguments probative (SCHOFIELD, 
1983, p. 56). 
 
Therefore, Stoics do not consider good speeches that tend to flourishes and 
digressions that make it long and excessive. They seek to express what is important for 
the understanding of facts, distancing themselves from strategies that appeal to 
pompous or argumentative subterfuge. 
According to Diogenes Laertius (VII, 42), Stoic rhetoric is established in three 
formats: deliberative (political), forensic, and encomiastic (solemn speech). This 
classification is conservative, as Gourinat (2000, p. 45) noted, as is the division of 
rhetorical speech into invention/discovery (heúresis), enunciation (phrásis), 
organization or arrangement (táxis), and representation (hypókrisis). Still regarding 
rhetorical speech, equally traditional is the division into preface (prooímion), exposition 
(diégesis), refutation of the opposing parties (pròs toùs antidíkous) and epilogue 
(epílogos) (DIOGENES LAERTIUS, VII, 43). 
According to Cicero, Stoics not only consider rhetoric a science, but also a virtue 
(De Oratore, III, XVIII, 65). This last aspect is important because they hold that the 
virtues are all united, being impossible to possess some virtues and not others 
                                            
3
 Atherton also quotes this passage in his article (cited above). Indeed this seems to show very well what 
the Stoics had in mind. 
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(STOBAEUS. Eclogae, II, 63, 6-25)
4
. Therefore, they consider that the achievement of 
good rhetoric is tied to other virtues (QUINTILIAN. Inst. Orat., I, 15, 34)
5
. In this case, 
not only the study of the forms, distinctions and details of speech is enough, but it is 
also necessary that the people themselves be virtuous in the other areas of life in order 
for their rhetoric to be excellent. To understand this, we can rescue the example of the 
Stoic Cato, whose striking rhetoric is allied to his famous righteousness of intentions 
and conduct (PLUTARCO. Vidas Paralelas, Catão, o Jovem).  
Stoicism is a philosophical current that adheres to the improvement of the 
individual as a whole, which considers the most diverse facets of the human being to be 
holistically connected (GILL, 2006, p. 33-34). In view of this, they do not see any 
purpose in a methodology that deals exclusively with the science of rhetoric and ignores 
improvement in other aspects. Moreover, Chrysippus, for example, does not see clarity 
and pure Greek as necessarily indispensable to good rhetoric, because they are often of 
diminished importance in detriment of the good intentions of the orator (PLUTARCH. 
De Stoic. Rep., 1047A-B)
6
. Besides, the correct appropriation of the subject, namely, its 
knowledge, provides conditions for a more natural and direct expression. As Cato 
said,”seize the subject, the words will follow" (IULIUS VICTOR. Ars Rhetorica, I, 17). 
 
Cicero's criticism of Stoics 
 
In De Oratore (II, 157-160), Cicero criticizes the Stoic style, defining it as obscure, 
scarce, and without spirit. He does not consider that Stoics can be of any help to those 
who want to speak well, because they attribute great importance to dialectics which, 
according to Cicero, does not contribute to the discovery of the truth, but only to test it. 
By believing in dialectics, Stoics get lost in logical details and even stick themselves in 
their own splinters, creating difficulties for themselves.  
Because they prefer substance over form, Stoics were considered to be less 
persuasive in assemblies. Cicero combats Stoic austerity and brevity even though, on 
                                            
4
 SVF III, 280. 
5
 CRISIPO DE SOLOS, fr. 385. 
6
 CRISIPO DE SOLOS, fr. 40. 
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the other hand, they are attractive to a Roman cultural elite for representing a natural 
and direct type of expression (STROUP, 2007, p. 27).  
Cicero, in turn, bets on a more ornate rhetoric, appealing to methodical strategies of 
persuasion, emotional manipulation, and care for the ethos of his listeners. An example 
of this is the difference between Cicero and Chrysippus when it comes to the final part 
of the speech, the epilogue: whereas to Chrysippus - as to Plato - the function of the 
epilogue is to "summarize each aspect in the end to remind those who listen to you of 
what has been said" (SPENGEL, Ars Rhetorica I, 454)
7
, to Cicero (De Inventione, I, 98, 
52-53), recapitulation is only one of the three parts of the epilogue, being included also 
indignation (indignatio) and compassion. In the last two aspects, absent from the Stoic 
proposal, occurs, respectively, aggression against the adversary and praise for oneself. 
In addition, the conclusion is carried out energetically, so as to stir the emotions of the 
auditorium. 
In relation to the invention of arguments, Cicero says that Stoics do not teach how 
to find out what to say, on the contrary, they even prevent it. Cicero says:  
 
In this connexion then that eminent Stoic is of no help to us, since he 
does not teach me how to discover what to say; and he actually hinders 
me, by finding many difficulties which he pronounces quite insoluble, 
and by introducing a kind of diction that is not lucid, copious and 
flowing, but meagre, spiritless, cramped and paltry; and, if any man 
commends this style, it will only be with the qualification that it is 
unsuitable to an orator. For this oratory of ours must be adapted to the 
ears of the multitude, for charming or urging their minds to approve of 
proposals, which are weighed in no goldsmith's balance, but in what I 
may call common scales (CICERO. De Oratore, II, 159 [Sutton]. 
 
To discover what to say in a rhetorical speech, Cicero follows the path trodden by 
Aristotle, whom he praises, by carrying out a study of every rhetorical tópos (locus), 
which is nothing more than the thirst for arguments (argumentorum sedes) and the  
topica being the art of finding arguments. The Roman criticizes Stoics in this matter, 
stating that they have abandoned this art, since they have restricted themselves only to 
the science of judgment, which they call dialectics. For Cicero, the topica is more 
                                            
7
 SVF II, 286. 
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important than the analysis of judgment, and should be placed first, being also called 
the “art of invention” (inventio) (CICERO. Topica, 6-8).     
As Nuñez points out, inventio is the “study of the various types of causes and the 
arguments that must be used on each occasion” (NUÑEZ, 1997, p. 14), “it is the 
obtaining and preparation of the appropriate arguments to the different types of causes” 
(NUÑEZ, 1997, p. 24). The cause, in this sense, refers to the constitutio (or status) of 
the question under discussion, to the situation in dispute, which in Greek translates as 
stasis
8
. For this reason, inventio is the art of finding arguments in the various types of 
questions, it is what enables the orator to identify the status of a cause and extract 
arguments from appropriate “places” (loci). For example: a controversy concerning a 
murder presents a conjectural status, as it refers to a fact (CICERO. De Inventione, I, 
10-11), and an argument for the defense of the accused of committing such a crime can 
be found in the locus of enumeration. As Cicero exemplifies: 
 
The accused must have committed murder by enmity, by fear, by hope, 
or by favoring some friend; if not for any of these reasons, he was not 
the murderer, for a crime is not committed without reason. If it is true 
that there was no enmity between them, nor anything to fear, nor hope 
to gain any benefit from his death, nor did this death interest any of 
his friends, we must conclude, therefore, that the accused did not kill 
him (CICERO. De Inventione, I, 45). 
 
As for eloquence, according to Cicero, it comes from other rhetorical strategies, 
such as the use of arguments at the right moments, in the right parts of speech, etc. In 
this case, the Roman distances himself from Cato's Stoic proposal of being more 
concerned with the mastery of the subject, with substance over form.  
On the other hand, even if Cicero is concerned with the form of speech, it cannot be 
said that he leaves aside the relevance of the content. The Roman does not criticize 
Stoics for this aspect, because he recognizes in them a depth of spirit caused by 
philosophical competence. In fact, what he seeks is precisely the union of two worlds: 
that of oratory and that of philosophy. Unlike Plato, Cicero considers the combination 
                                            
8
 As Atherton says: “The stasis (or status [or constitutio]) of a case, roughly speaking, is the 'issue' on 
which it turns the point which if decided will determine the outcome of the whole case”. (ATHERTON, 
1988, p. 393 [note 4]). Or as Cicero reports: "constitutio is the first conflict that arises when rejecting the 
accusation. For example: ‘you did this’, ‘you did not do it’ or ‘I was entitled to do it'” (De Inventione I, 
10). 
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of philosophy and rhetoric to be relevant, because in this way it is possible for orators to 
contribute to the qualification of public affairs, opening space for the insertion of 
philosophy in political and legal debates as well as other fields relevant to citizenship
9
. 
Furthermore, philosophy also serves to give content and good training to orators. In 
doing so, Cicero attaches great importance to the figure of the orator for the formation 
of the Roman public man (NUÑEZ, 1997, p. 25-26), an attribution that has become 
famous and certainly remarkable for the history of Rome.  
Philosophy (sapientia), as noted, is an important component for the formation of 
the orator, since it contributes greatly to eloquence. In this sense, Cicero proposes an 
end to the dispute between rhetoricians and philosophers, presenting as a solution for 
the orator the union between these two worlds. This split between rhetoric and 
philosophy, which became famous with Plato (PINTO, 2010, p. 81-82), is criticized by 
Cicero, since, according to the Roman, this gives less power of persuasion to the 
philosophical content itself. In view of this, Cicero brings Greek philosophy to the 
Roman way of life (AUVRAY-ASSAYAS, 2018, p. 58-62), more accustomed to the 
pursuit of political eloquence by means of imposing and solemn speeches. 
On the other hand, although Cicero considered the Stoic speech not very eloquent, 
preferring and praising the Aristotelian contribution, it is important to note that the 
Roman went beyond Aristotle's proposal: although the Stagirite occupied himself with 
the theme of passions in his Rhetoric, his emphasis still remained on the structure of 
arguments. Cicero, for his part, preferred to do the opposite: he devoted himself more to 
what derives from the self-representation of the orator and the passions aroused in the 
public than to the proofs derived from arguments (FREITAS, 2017, p. 113-114). 
 
Back to Stoics 
 
For Cicero (De Oratore, I, LIII 228-LV 233), an emblematic case that highlights 
the problem of Stoa rhetoric was the condemnation of the Stoic Publius Rutilius Rufus. 
Rufus refused to make passionate appeals and gave up any ornament in his defense 
                                            
9
 “(...) the interest of the city is not to separate philosophy and eloquence, but to unite both (CICERO. De 
Inventione, I, 1, 1 e 4,5). 
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speech, restricting himself to the pure truth that the subject allowed. This case is 
interesting because it bears similarities to the way Socrates performed his defense, as 
described by Plato in his Apology. Socrates did not make an ingenious or beautiful 
speech, but asked the judges to ignore the way in which he would express himself and 
dwell only on the analysis of the matter (MAY, 2002, p. 64). The Athenian rejected the 
strategies of conventional oratory and demonstrated great dialectical skill. 
Just as Socrates was not persuasive enough in his defense, it can be said that the 
same was true for Rutilius Rufus. To Cicero (De Oratore. I, 230), Rufus was a great 
human being, but unfortunately he did not obtain absolution precisely because of his 
Stoic insistence not to worry about abundance in speech and not to appeal to strategies 
of emotional manipulation. In affirming this, Cicero wanted to demonstrate that Stoic 
rhetoric has little power of persuasion to the public. 
According to Atherton (1988, p. 34-36), Socratic dialectics is not oriented to 
political speeches or to a large audience, but to one-on-one philosophical encounters. 
Stoics, on the other hand, seek to provide a model of discourse that embraces both the 
public and the private spheres, since the Stoic philosopher does not have a public and a 
private language. In view of this, Atherton maintains, Stoic rhetoric, subsidized by the 
analysis of judgments of its dialectics, may even prove more precise, but less 
convincing to a plural audience. Moreover, and not least important, Atherton argues that 
because Stoics regard rhetoric as a virtue, they end up disregarding the public success of 
speeches, since virtue is a matter of private success. By seeing virtue in good speech, 
Stoics eliminate the public criteria of success and failure.  
On the other hand, it is known, as has already been seen, that it is not the case that 
Stoics bring only elements of dialectics for the elaboration of rhetorical speech. Despite 
Socratic influence, there is also, in Stoicism, a specific study of rhetoric. It cannot be 
said that Stoics simply ignore methods of organizing speech in a way that is better 
understood by the public. What they do, in fact, is to devote themselves not to the 
particularities of their audience, but to what is common between the orator and any 
public: reason. Taking into account the human condition of dealing with judgments, 
Stoics establish a clear rhetoric in order to make the issues evident. To Stoicism, as to 
Socrates, evil is only done by mistake, since no one chooses evil because they want to, 
but because they have made a mistake. Even passions (which are negative emotions for 
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Stoics) occur through judgments, because they are the fruit of opinions, of a view of the 
world, of things, or of people (DIOGENES LAERTIUS, VII, 110-116). For this reason, 
it is also not the case that they disregard the emotional reaction of the public through 
speech: in fact, Stoics know that they can arouse various emotional reactions, because 
they are tied to the opinions that the listeners possess. As the speech develops, the 
judgments of the listeners are put to the test and may trigger particular passionate 
reactions, according to each person. Thus, it is not the case to claim that the sobriety of 
Stoic rhetoric necessarily implies cold speeches or, as Sarah C. Stroup mentions (2007, 
p. 27), more adequate for a library. The core of the matter is that Stoics try to make an 
exposition in the best possible way through speech: it is the challenge of speaking 
veraciously, and the main goal is not simply to win a legal or political dispute. 
Commitment to the truth requires much more than commitment to advocate in a judicial 
or ideological cause. 
What Cicero criticizes in Stoicism is precisely what caused Stoic innovation in the 
field of rhetoric: the incorporation of dialectical questions (GOURINAT, 2000, p. 41). 
Stoic accuracy of speech provided by the dialectical resource indicates a greater concern 
than the persuasion of a particular audience with a particular culture. Although Cicero 
criticized the position of Stoá philosophers, considering it unfit for political oratory
10
, it 
is important to note that Stoics understand the political ideal of harmony (homónoia) by 
a broader view, since they refer to the cosmic dimension of the human being, a 
dimension that underpins cosmopolitanism, the universal citizenship based on a 
community of rational beings. In view of this, communion by lógos is the most 
important thing for Stoics, since, for them, reason is what underpins politics beyond the 
different kinds of ethos of peoples (MARCUS AURELIUS, Meditations, IV, 4). 
A more specific example of how dialectics adheres to rhetoric can be found in the 
thought of the Stoic Posidonius. Thanks to Quintilian's testimony, we know that 
Posidonius makes an analysis of the status of rhetoric in the light of dialectics. In 
Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian states that the Stoic divides status (stásis) into two genres, 
having each genre subdivisions. These genres are (I) vox (language) and (ii) res 
                                            
10
 Criticism that philosophy found no place in the conciliation of a broader audience is also noted by 
Philodemus in SUDHAUS, Philodemi Volumina Retórica II, col. XVIII, 9-20, p. 223 (Fr. 388 - Crisipo 
de Solos). 
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(thing/fact), and are directly associated with the division of Stoic dialectics into phoné 
(significant) e prágmata (signifieds) (KIDD, 2004, p. 687). As Quintilian states, these 
genres are subdivided as follows:   
 
Under language he thinks come the questions: 'Does this have any 
meaning?'; 'What is its meaning?'; 'How many meanings has it?'; 'And 
how?' Under fact he classifies 'conjecture', which he says depends on 
sense-perception; 'quality', that is definition of the fact, which 
Posidonius names as conceptual; and 'relation'. A result of this 
classification is another division into 'written' [law] and 'unwritten' 
(QUINTILIAN. Institutio Oratoria, III, 6, 37-8)
11
. 
 
As seen in the above section, it is not possible to characterize Stoic rhetoric as 
shallow or poorly elaborated. What can be noticed is that the Stoics devoted themselves 
to it in a different way than Cicero. Given the specificity of the Stoic philosophical 
paradigm, it must be understood that their idea of rhetoric is not the same as Cicero's. In 
view of this, it is necessary to contextualize Cicero's criticism of Stoics, knowing the 
different speech proposals and the different objectives pursued by both. 
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